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THE ORDINARY BUSINESS OPERATIONS EXCEPTION TO
THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE: A
RETURN TO PREDICTABILITY
Kevin W. Waite
INTRODUCTION
The law firm of Smith & Jones is general counsel to MOW Corpora-
tion ("MOW"). On Friday afternoon at around 4:30 partner Joe
Smith's phone rings (as it always seems to do at that time on Friday).
The call is from Jon Adams, an officer of MOW. Adams is very angry
and says he just faxed Smith a letter that he received. He wants Smith
to take a look at it and call him right back. Smith retrieves the fax and
begins reading it. It is a letter from a shareholder of MOW requesting
that the following preambles and resolution be placed in MOW's
proxy statement and form of proxy for the upcoming annual meeting
of shareholders:
WHEREAS, the Corporation has for years maintained and prac-
ticed a policy of discrimination in employment; and
WHEREAS, said policy of discrimination is socially unacceptable
and has a detrimental effect on the business operations of the
Corporation;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that the Corporation
shall discontinue its policy of discrimination and shall institute an
affirmative action program; and
RESOLVED, that the Corporation shall prepare and furnish to the
shareholders of the Corporation a report describing in reasonable
detail the affirmative action program that has been instituted and
shall thereafter from time to time furnish to the shareholders of the
Corporation a report describing in reasonable detail the results of
the affirmative action program that has been instituted.
After reviewing the fax, Smith calls Adams. Adams tells Smith that
the Company is very upset by the proposal and does not want to in-
clude the resolution in its proxy material. He says that MOW does
not discriminate in its hiring and does not want to enact a formal af-
firmative action program. He asks Smith to advise MOW whether the
resolution must be included in the Corporation's proxy statement and
form of proxy. He also requests that Smith prepare a letter on
MOW's behalf to the Securities and Exchange Commission requesting
a no-action letter.1
1. A no-action letter is an interpretation by the staff of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission provided in response to company inquiries asking whether the
staff will recommend to the Commission that any enforcement action be taken. See
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After hanging up, Smith calls his most trusted associate, Mary
Miknora, into his office. He tells her what has transpired and asks her
to do a little research and then draft the no-action request to the SEC.
Mary leaves the office thinking that this project should be fairly easy.
After all, she figures she just has to look at the proxy rules and some
interpretive cases to come to a conclusion and prepare a no-action
request. Little does she know, her assignment is not going to be as
easy as she thinks.
The shareholder proposal rule2 was first enacted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission") in 1942
pursuant to authority granted to it by Congress under Section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act").3 The rule requires
inclusion in management's proxy material of a shareholder proposal
for action at a company's annual meeting if certain procedural4 and
substantive5 requirements are met. One of these substantive require-
ments is that the shareholder proposal must not relate to the ordinary
Lewis D. Solomon et al., Corporations Law and Policy: Materials and Problems 613
(3d ed. 1994).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1995).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994)).
4. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)-(b) (1995). Rule 14a-8(a)(1) requires that the
shareholder submitting the proposal (the "proponent") own at least 1% or $1000 in
market value of securities at the time that he submits the proposal and to have owned
said amount of securities for at least one year prior to submitting the proposal. Id.
§ 240.14a-8(a)(1). Further, the proponent.must continue to hold the required amount
of securities through the date on which the meeting is held. Id.
Rule 14a-8(a)(2) provides that, when submitting the proposal, "a proponent shall
provide the registrant in writing with his name, address, the number of the registrant's
voting securities that he holds of record or beneficially, the dates upon which he ac-
quired such securities, and documentary support for a claim of beneficial ownership."
Id. § 240.14a-8(a)(2).
Rule 14a-8(a)(3) imposes certain time constraints within which a proponent must
submit a shareholder proposal with respect to annual or other meetings. Id. § 240.14a-
8(a)(3).
Rule 14a-8(a)(4) limits the number of shareholder proposals that a proponent may
submit to one proposal. Id. § 240.14a-8(a)(4).
Rule 14a-8(b)(1) provides that the proponent shall include a statement in support
of the proposal not to exceed 500 words that must be submitted at the time that the
proposal is submitted. Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(1).
Rule 14a-8(b)(2) provides for identification of the proponent in the proxy state-
ment. Id. § 240.14a-8(b)(2).
5. The substantive requirements are found in Rule 14a-8(c)(1)-(13). A registrant
may omit a shareholder proposal and supporting statement from its proxy statement
and form of proxy:
(1) If the proposal is, under the laws of the registrant's domicile, not a
proper subject for action by security holders ... [;]
(2) If the proposal, if implemented, would require the registrant to violate
any state law or Federal law of the United States, or any law of any foreign
jurisdiction to which the registrant is subject... [;]
(3) If the proposal or the supporting statement is contrary to any of the
Commission's proxy rules and regulations... ;
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business operations of the issuer.6 This requirement is known as the
ordinary business operations exception and is intended to make sure
that everyday business decisions are made by management.
The ordinary business operations exception has been construed, un-
til recently,7 as a two-part test.8 In 1976, the SEC issued a release (the
"1976 Release") stating that for a registrant to rely on the exception
to exclude a shareholder proposal from its proxy material, the propo-
sal must not only relate to the ordinary business operations of the
issuer, but must also not raise any substantial policy issues.9 If a sub-
stantial policy issue is raised by the proposal, the proposal must be
included. The question therefore becomes: What constitutes a sub-
stantial policy issue?
The SEC staff,10 through the no-action process," has attempted to
define "substantial policy issue" within the meaning of the ordinary
business operations exception. Due to the subjectiveness of the ex-
ception, however, the SEC staff has on numerous occasions reversed
(4) If the proposal relates to the redress of a personal claim or grievance...
or if it is designed to result in a benefit to the proponent or to further a
personal interest... ;
(5) If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 per-
cent of the registrant's total assets... and for less than 5 percent of its net
earnings and gross sales ... and is not otherwise significantly related to the
registrant's business;
(6) If the proposal deals with a matter beyond the registrant's power to
effectuate;
(7) If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordi-
nary business operations of the registrant;
(8) If the proposal relates to an election to office;
(9) If the proposal is counter to a proposal to be submitted by the registrant
at the meeting;
(10) If the proposal has been rendered moot;
(11) If the proposal is substantially duplicative of a proposal previously sub-
mitted to the registrant by another proponent, which proposal will be in-
cluded in the registrant's proxy material for the meeting;
(12) If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as a
prior proposal submitted to security holders in the registrant's proxy state-
ment and form of proxy relating to any annual or special meeting ... held
within the preceding five calendar years [and that prior proposal received
little support]; or
(13) If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (1995).
6. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(7).
7. See infra notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
8. See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Ex-
change Act Release No. 12,999, 41 Fed. Reg. 52,994, 52,997-98 (1976) [hereinafter
1976 Release].
9. Id. at 52,998.
10. The SEC staff issues no-action letters. These interpretations are not automati-
cally reviewable by the SEC itself, although it may entertain an appeal if it chooses.
See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821
F. Supp. 877, 884 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Shareholders and management have no right
to appeal staff advice to the Commission, although the Commission may, in its discre-
tion, grant a party's request for review.").
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its position as to what constitutes a substantial policy issue. Specifi-
cally, the staff has recently determined that proposals dealing with ex-
ecutive compensation,' 2 golden parachutes,' 3 plant closings,' 4 and
tobacco products' 5 raise substantial policy issues and warrant inclu-
sion in a registrant's proxy material. Previously, the staff had treated
these types of proposals as excludable because they dealt with matters
relating to the ordinary business operations of the issuer and raised no
substantial policy issues.
Such reversals evidence the problems with the ordinary business op-
erations exception when the two-prong test discussed in the 1976 Re-
lease is applied. Trying to define "substantial policy" is very difficult,
if not impossible, to do. Which policies are substantial will change
over time. Further, the point at which a policy issue becomes "sub-
stantial" is unclear. It is a subjective standard. The determination
needs to be tied to an objective standard if the ordinary business oper-
ations exception is to be effective.
The ordinary business operations exception becomes further com-
plicated when a registrant is involved in a business that on its face
implicates substantial policy issues, such as weapons manufacturing. 16
In such a case, under a literal application of the two-prong test, every
shareholder proposal offered by a proponent would have to be in-
cluded because all decisions, no matter how small, would in some way
implicate a substantial policy issue. These companies should not be
subject to the burden of always having to include a shareholder propo-
sal that objects to what they are manufacturing. Investors should not
be able to "regularly use their shareholder status as a bully pulpit." 7
In 1992, recognizing the difficulty in making the substantial policy
determination, the Commission revised its interpretation of the ordi-
nary business operations exception with respect to affirmative action
11. The no-action letters issued by the SEC are non-binding, even on the parties
to which the no-action letter is specifically addressed. For a discussion of the no-
action process, see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. A golden parachute provides
benefits to executives of a company if they leave the company as a result of certain
events, such as a merger.
14. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (holding that a shareholder proposal,
submitted by Medical Committee, requesting the board of directors of Dow Chemical
Company to amend its certificate of incorporation to bar the sale of napalm that was
to be used in the Vietnam War unless the buyer gave reasonable assurance that the
napalm would not be used on humans, could not be excluded based on the ordinary
business operations exception).
17. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 9 (2d Cir.
1995).
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and equal employment opportunity proposals."8 In a no-action letter
issued to Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.,19 the SEC staff
stated that even though a shareholder proposal dealing with equal em-
ployment opportunity for homosexuals was tied to a policy issue, it
could be excluded based on the ordinary business operations excep-
tion because the staff could not draw the line between substantial and
non-substantial policy issues.0 The proponent of the shareholder pro-
posal sued.21 Although the district court held that the staff could not
simply refuse to apply the two-part test from the 1976 Release z the
Second Circuit reversed, holding that the staff could properly refuse? 3
While this litigation was pending, the SEC declined to issue any no-
action letters to registrants pursuant to Rule 14a-8(c)(7). 24 This left
many companies and their counsel in a precarious position.25
Although an SEC no-action letter is not binding,2 it is granted great
18. See Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1992-
1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,418 (Oct. 13, 1992) [hereinafter
Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter]. As a result of its interpretation, the SEC was sub-
jected to years of litigation. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC,
843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995). For a discussion of
this litigation, see infra notes 112-32 and accompanying text.
19. Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 18.
20. Id. at 77,287; see infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
21. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
22. See id. at 882.
23. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC. 45 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir.
1995).
24. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 299 (Feb. 8, 1994) (stating that "[iln view of the pending [Cracker Barrel]
litigation..., the Division has determined not to express any view with respect to the
application of rule 14a-8(c)(7) to any shareholder proposal pending resolution of this
matter on appeal"); see also Staff Ordinary Business Stance Leaves Counsel Over a
Barrel in Proxy Season, 26 Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 637 (Apr. 29, 1994)
(stating that the SEC staff declined to take any position in 11 requests for no-action
letters pursuant to the ordinary business operations exception).
25. See Staff Ordinary Business Stance Leaves Counsel Over a Barrel in Proxy Sea-
son, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 637 (Apr. 29, 1994).
26. The SEC staff performs only an informal, non-binding review of no-action re-
quests submitted by registrants. See Statement of Informal Procedures for the Ren-
dering of Staff Advice with Respect to Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release
No. 12,599, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 80,635 (July 7,
1976). The Commission has stated that:
IT]he Commission and its Staff do not purport in any way to issue "rulings"
or "decisions" on shareholder proposals which management indicates it in-
tends to omit, and they do not adjudicate the merits of a management's pos-
ture concerning such a proposal. As a result, the informal advice and
suggestions emanating from the Staff in this area are not binding on either
managements or proponents. Further, nothing the SEC or its Staff does or
omits to do in connection with such proposals affects the right of the propo-
nent, or any shareholder, to institute a private action with respect to the
management's intention to omit that proposal from its proxy materials. In
summary, the sole purpose of staff review and comment with respect to
proxy matters, including stockholder proposals, is to promote compliance
1995] 1257
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deference. Without a no-action letter from the SEC, many companies
and their counsel had to decide on their own whether a given proposal
was excludable under 14a-8(c)(7).2 7 The SEC's refusal to issue no-
action letters with respect to 14a-8(c)(7) produced a great deal of un-
certainty and created a greater threat of litigation by shareholders
who wished to get their proposals into management's proxy
statement.28
Thus, the SEC has departed from using the two-prong test for
shareholder proposals dealing with affirmative action and equal em-
ployment opportunity 9 and the Second Circuit has upheld its choice
to do so. 30 The floodgates are now open for registrants to claim that a
distinction cannot be drawn between substantial and non-substantial
policy issues in areas other than affirmative action and equal employ-
ment opportunity. The ordinary business operations exception has
therefore become a guessing game and its utility almost nonexistent.
The position the staff will take with respect to any particular proposal
is difficult to predict. The staff can always simply say that, based on
Cracker Barrel, the line between a substantial and a non-substantial
policy issue is too fine to draw and that the proposal can therefore be
excluded. The staff can just as easily say that the issue is substantial
and must be included. Moreover, it can change positions from one
year to the next, as it has done numerous times in the past.31 This lack
of predictability and confusion over the application of the ordinary
business operations exception clearly presents the need for a change.
Part I of this Note will address the history of the ordinary business
operations exception and will analyze the intent of the Commission in
promulgating the exception. It will also discuss the origin of the sub-
stantial policy prong of the two-prong test created in the 1976 Release.
Part II will present an overview of some recent SEC staff reversals as
to what constitutes a substantial policy issue and therefore must be
included in management's proxy material. Specifically, this part will
review reversals with respect to shareholder proposals dealing with
with the proxy rules and to assist both management and the Commission in
avoiding the possibility of unnecessary litigation between them.
Id. at 86,602-03; see also New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d
7, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that no-action letters are interpretive and not legislative
for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act "because they do not impose or fix
a legal relationship upon any of the parties"); Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stat-
ing that "the ad hoc nature of [no-action] letters means that courts cannot place them
on a precedential par with formal rulemaking or adjudication").
27. See Staff Ordinary Business Stance Leaves Counsel Over a Barrel in Proxy Sea-
son, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 637 (Apr. 29, 1994).
28. See id. at 638.
29. Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 18, at 77,287.
30. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 14 (2d Cir.
1995).
31. See infra notes 79-107 and accompanying text.
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plant closings,32 tobacco products,33 and executive compensation.
Part III will analyze the recent litigation over the operation of Rule
14a-8(c)(7) resulting from the staff's refusal to apply the two-prong
test for shareholder proposals regarding affirmative action programs
and equal employment opportunity policies. Finally, in part IV, this
Note suggests that, due to the unnecessary confusion caused by the
ordinary business operations exception and the difficulty in applying
the standard, the exception should be eliminated.
I. HISTORY OF THE ORDINARY BUSINESS OPERATIONS
EXCEPTION
The system of proxy solicitation plays a vital role in the functioning
of corporations and in determining how they will be governed.3 5
Proxy solicitation provides the means for obtaining the votes of the
many shareholders who do not attend shareholder meetings. 6 With-
out the proxy system, corporations would never be able to approve
certain transactions that require shareholder approval due to the vir-
tual impossibility of getting the needed number of shareholders in one
place at one time.37 Finally, some shareholders would never be able
to have a voice in corporate governance without the proxy mecha-
nism.38 Thus, in a world filled with many large corporations with
shareholders spread throughout the world, a workable set of proxy
rules is essential.3 9
With this in mind, in the 1934 Act, Congress granted the SEC the
power to regulate corporate proxy solicitation to the extent "neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors."'  By enacting Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, Congress
intended to curb management abuse of the proxy solicitation pro-
cess. 41 It hoped to accomplish this by fostering disclosure and corpo-
32. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
35. See Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 449 (2d ed. 1988); Sol-
omon et al., supra note 1, at 558-59.
36. See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that "[p]roxies have become an
indispensable part of corporate governance because the 'realities of modem corpo-
rate life have all but gutted the myth that shareholders in large publicly held compa-
nies personally attend annual meetings"' (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 Ai2d 75, 86
(Del. 1992))).
37. See Solomon et al., supra note 1, at 558.
38. See id.
39. See Loss, supra note 35, at 449 (noting that the "widespread distribution of
corporate securities, with the concomitant separation of ownership and management,
puts the entire concept of the stockholders' meeting at the mercy of the proxy
instrument").
40. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C § 78n(a) (1994)).
41. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 20 (1934).
1995] 1259
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rate democracy.42 Although the role that Congress intended
shareholders to play in corporate governance is not explicitly stated in
Section 14(a), 3 Congress apparently wanted to give shareholders
some corporate decision-making power. 4
The shareholder proposal rule was first enacted in 1942 4 and was
amended frequently thereafter.46 The original rule did not include the
ordinary business operations exception. The original rule simply re-
quired management to include in its proxy material any shareholder
proposal that was "a proper subject for action by security holders. 47
It was later made clear that a "proper subject" was to be determined
42. See id.; see also Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676
(D.C. Cir. 1970) ("It is obvious to the point of banality to restate the proposition that
Congress intended by its enactment of section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to give true vitality to the concept of corporate democracy."); Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 881-
82 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Section 14(a) [of the 1934 Act] and the SEC's implementing
regulations seek 'to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for
corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicita-
tion.'" (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964))); Proposed Amend-
ments to Rule 14a-8, Exchange Act Release No. 12,598, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,982, 29,984
(1976) (proposed July 7, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Proposal] ("[S]ection 14(a) of the
Exchange Act ... was enacted to promote corporate suffrage and to limit those situa-
tions in which public corporations are controlled by a small number of persons.");
Solomon et al., supra note 1, at 559 (stating that "[t]he legislative history of SEC
proxy regulation indicates that the Congressional concern was to provide 'fair corpo-
rate suffrage' "); Eric A. Welter, Note, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Change to
Certainty, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1980, 1990 (1992) ("The legislative history of section
14(a) of the 1934 Act reveals the dual concerns of Congress: disclosure and share-
holder democracy.").
43. See Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Cor-
porate Democracy, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 97, 124 (1988) (stating that Section 14(a) does not
"give on its face any hint of what the appropriate shareholder role might be in corpo-
rate governance"); Welter, supra note 42, at 1990 (stating that "section 14(a) of the
1934 Act itself fails to provide any explicit indication of the role of the shareholder in
the affairs of the corporation").
44. Welter, supra note 42, at 1990 (asserting that "Congress apparently was con-
cerned with providing shareholders a role in corporate decisionmaking").
45. Solicitation of Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 7 Fed.
Reg. 10,655 (1942). This Note focuses on the ordinary business operations exception
and will therefore not discuss in detail the history of the other provisions of the share-
holder proposal rule. For a history of the shareholder proposal rule in general, see
Securities and Exchange Comm'n Div. of Corporation Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Staff Report on Corporate Accountability B12-22 (Comm. Print 1980); Susan W.
Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 425,
427 (1984); Welter, supra note 42, at 1982-88. For an extensive list of commentaries
regarding the shareholder proposal rule, many of which contain a history of the rule,
see Ryan, supra note 43, at 99 n.8.
46. See Liebeler, supra note 45, at 428 (stating that "[flollowing the [shareholder
proposal] rule's adoption in 1942, the SEC continually revised the rule in an attempt
to curb abuses by proponents and to determine what constitutes a 'proper subject' for
proposals under state law").
47. Solicitation of Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 7 Fed.
Reg. 10,655, 10,656 (1942). The shareholder proposal rule was originally enacted as
Rule 14a-7. It is now Rule 14a-8. See Welter, supra note 42, at 1980-82.
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by reference to the law of the state in which the company was incorpo-
rated.4 Today, the provision specifically states that a proposal is ex-
cludable if it is not a proper subject for security holder action "under
the laws of the registrant's domicile."49
Because little state law was developed discussing what was a proper
subject for action by security holders,50 the SEC staff developed its
own common law regarding what was a proper subject for shareholder
action.5 1 While the SEC claimed to be relying on state law in deter-
mining what was a proper subject for shareholder action, the SEC
more accurately appeared to be deciding what the state law was and
influencing state courts in deciding the rare case that arose regarding
what was a proper subject for shareholder action.5
48. The Director of the SEC stated in a 1945 opinion that:
Speaking generally, it is the purpose of Rule X-14A-7 to place stockhold-
ers in a position to bring before their fellow stockholders matters of concern
to them as stockholders in such corporation; that is, such matters relating to
the affairs of the company concerned as are proper subjects for the stock-
holders' action under the laws of the state under which it is organized. It
was not the intent of Rule X-14A-7 to permit stockholders to obtain the
consensus of other stockholders with respect to matters which are of a gen-
eral political, social or economic nature. Other forums exist for the presen-
tation of such views.
Investment Company Act Release No. 735, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,995 (1945). The reliance
by the SEC on state law to determine "proper subject" was upheld in SEC v. Trans-
america Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 516-18 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948).
See Herbert A. Gocha, Jr., Comment, The 1980's Amendments to Shareholder Propo-
sal Rule 14a-8. A Final Damper on Dissent?, 17 U. Tol. L. Rev. 411, 417 (1986) (stat-
ing that "[t]he ultimate effect of Transamerica was to establish that state law would
control for purposes of determining which subjects are indeed 'proper' ").
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1995).
50. Most corporation statutes simply provide that the business and affairs of every
corporation shall be managed by a board of directors. Se4 eg., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 141(a) (1991) (stating that "[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized
under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
tors"); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 701 (McKinney 1986) (stating that "the business of a
corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of directors").
51. See 4 Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 2012 (3d ed. 1990)
("Inevitably the Commission (normally its staff), while purporting to find and apply a
generally nonexistent state law, has been building a 'common law' of its own as to
what constitutes a 'proper subject' for shareholder action."); Welter, supra note 42, at
1983 ("The lack of state law... led the SEC to interpret the 'proper subject' standard
itself, eventually developing a type of 'common law' of its own."); see also Timothy L.
Feagans, Comment, SEC Rule 14a-8. New Restrictions on Corporate Democracy?, 33
Buff. L. Rev. 225, 236 (1984) (noting that "[t]he paucity of state law, both statutory
and decisional, compelled the SEC to develop its own administrative guidelines re-
garding when a proposal was a 'proper subject for action by security holders' "); Note,
Shareholder Proposals: The Experience of Rule 14a-8, 59 Geo. L.. 1343, 1371 (1971)
("The evolution of the shareholder proposal rule from its simple genesis through the
substantive amendments of 1954 and 1967 is evidence of a body of 'common law'
directly resulting from the SEC's administrative experience.").
52. See 4 Loss & Seligman, supra note 51, at 2012.
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The ordinary business operations exception was first enacted as
Section 14a-8(c)(5) in 1954.11 As originally enacted, the exception
provided that management could "omit from its proxy material a pro-
posal which is a recommendation or request with respect to the con-
duct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer."54 The
Cormnission promulgated the ordinary business operations exception
"[i]n order to relieve the management of the necessity of including in
its proxy material security holder proposals which relate to matters
falling within the province of the management. '55 Although a propo-
sal dealing with the ordinary business operations of the issuer might
be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(1) as an improper subject for
shareholder action,56 the possibility remained that a proposal would
be includable if framed in precatory, rather than mandatory, lan-
guage. 7 The Commission wanted to include explicitly the presump-
tion that under state corporate law day-to-day business operations are
left to management and the board of directors and thus are not proper
subjects for shareholder action 58 regardless of whether or not a pro-
posal is framed in mandatory or precatory language.
The next major event in the life of the ordinary business operations
exception occurred in 1976. Because the exception was often used to
exclude proposals that were of considerable importance to both the
issuer and the security holder,59 and because the SEC did not believe
that the ordinary business operations exception was fostering what it
felt to be the proper level of corporate democracy,60 the Commission
proposed two alternative changes to the ordinary business operations
exception and requested comments on each.6'
The first proposed change was to enact a provision that would allow
a shareholder proposal to be omitted only if it dealt with a "routine,
day-to-day matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business op-
53. Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 4979,
[1952-1956 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,267 (Jan. 6, 1954).
54. Id. at 79,247.
55. Notice of Proposed Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
4950, 1953 SEC LEXIS 146 (Oct. 9, 1953).
56. Rule 14a-8(c)(1) allows an issuer to exclude a shareholder proposal if the pro-
posal is not a proper subject for shareholder action under state law. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1995). Whether the proposal is proper under state law, however,
may turn on whether the proposal is framed in mandatory or precatory language. See
id. A precatory proposal is one that is framed as a recommendation to the board of
directors rather than a mandate to the board that it take action. See id.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1995); see supra note 56.
58. See Welter, supra note 42, at 1985.
59. See 1976 Proposal, supra note 42, at 29,984. The SEC voiced concern over the
possibility that, due to management's use of the shareholder proposal rule to exclude
matters of concern to shareholders, the rule might not be operating "completely in
accord with the purposes for which Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act was enacted."
Id.
60. See 1976 Release, supra note 8, at 52,997.
61. See 1976 Proposal, supra note 42, at 29,984-85.
1262 [Vol. 64
BUSINESS OPERATIONS EXCEPTION
erations of the issuer" (the "First 1976 Proposal").' The SEC stated
that a company would not be able to rely upon this provision to ex-
clude a shareholder proposal involving an important business matter,
even if the proposal was related to the ordinary business operations of
the company.' The test that the Commission proposed to distinguish
between routine and important business matters was: "Will it be nec-
essary for the board of directors (or other governing body of the is-
suer, such as the board of trustees) to act on the matter involved in the
proposal?" 6"
The second proposal was an alternate proposal to the first (the
"Second 1976 Proposal"). The Second 1976 Proposal was to allow
omission of a shareholder proposal if it "deals with a matter that the
governing body of the issuer (such as the Board of Directors) is not
required to act upon pursuant to the applicable State law or issuer's
governing instruments (such as the Charter or By-Laws)."' The Sec-
ond 1976 Proposal was proposed because "the Commission recog-
nize[d] that proposed paragraph[] . . . (c)(7) [might] create
interpretative difficulties that might not arise under the proposed al-
ternative provision. ' 66
Many of the comments received by the Commission on the First
1976 Proposal stated that it would not be helpful because shareholders
are not qualified to act on ordinary business matters of a complex
nature, something they would be able to do if the First 1976 Proposal
was promulgated as written.67 Further, many commentators claimed,
the rule was too subjective and would cause interpretation problems.6
The comments received by the Commission on the Second 1976
Proposal also stated that such a rule was not workable.69 Because
many state statutes and corporate governing instruments do not spec-
ify when director action is required, but rather simply say that the
corporation is to be managed by the board of directors, "the applica-
tion of the proposed 'board-action' standard would turn upon the is-
sues of delegation of authority and proper board practices. ' 7° The
Commission believed that resolution of these issues would be too
complex, and therefore stated that the standard was not workable.71
The Commission therefore decided to enact neither the First 1976
Proposal nor the Second 1976 Proposal, but rather to enact a modified
62. 1976 Proposal, supra note 42, at 29,984.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 29,985.
66. 1&
67. See 1976 Release, supra note 8, at 52,997.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 52,998.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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version of the language already being used.72 This modified version of
the ordinary business operations exception was not much of a depar-
ture from the language already existing, and is the exception that ex-
ists today. It states that a shareholder proposal is excludable if it
"deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business
operations of the issuer. '73 The reasons the Commission gave for not
adopting the First 1976 Proposal or the Second 1976 Proposal were
that (i) the difficulties caused by the proposed standards would out-
weigh any benefits either would provide, (ii) the standard already in
effect was workable if interpreted in a more flexible manner, and (iii)
no reasonable means were apparent to distinguish between routine
and important business matters. 74
The Commission stated that, although the language of the exception
had not greatly changed, a two-part test would thereafter be applica-
ble to the new ordinary business operations exception.75 This new test
would require inclusion of shareholder proposals that raised impor-
tant policy issues 76 and would, according to the SEC, "produce results
that were more in accord with the concept of shareholder democracy
underlying Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. '77 The two-part test
enunciated by the Commission provided that, in order for a company
to rely on the ordinary business operations exception to exclude a
shareholder proposal, the proposal must first "involve business mat-
ters that are mundane in nature and [second, must] not involve any
substantial policy or other considerations. 78
On its face, it may appear that a clear test would make Rule 14a-
8(c)(7) easier to administer. As will be seen in parts II and III of this
Note, however, this two-part test did not solve any problems and in
fact served only to create confusion.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 52,997-98.
75. Id. at 52,998; see New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F.
Supp. 858, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995). The District Court for
the Southern District of New York stated:
Thie amendment that was adopted [in 1976] took the form of a facially insig-
nificant change. . . .However, the SEC simultaneously explained that
notwithstanding the similarity between the old and new rules, the amended
rule was intended to signal an SEC shift in position and that it would hence-
forth prohibit exclusion of proposals involving substantial policy considera-
tions, even if they otherwise could be said to deal with "ordinary business
operations."
Id.
76. See 1976 Release, supra note 8, at 52,998.
77. Id. at 52,997.
78. Id. at 52,998.
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I. STAFF REVERSALS
The SEC and its staff, while attempting to apply the two-part test,79
has many times reversed its position on a given issue 80 without giving
any strong support for its choice to do so."' These reversals evidence
the subjectiveness of the substantial policy determination and show
that the ordinary business operations exception cannot be applied
consistently. Almost all proposals that deal with ordinary business
also raise policy issues to some degree. Because policy issues change
over time and because the determination as to when a policy issue
becomes "substantial" is subjective, a lot of uncertainty exists each
year as to whether a particular shareholder proposal will be excluda-
ble pursuant to the ordinary business operations exception.'n The de-
gree of uncertainty has been exacerbated by the Second Circuit's
decision8 3 to uphold the SEC's choice to abandon the two-prong test
when deciding if an affirmative action or equal employment opportu-
nity proposal can be excluded based on the ordinary business opera-
tions exception.' Now, neither registrants nor shareholders will know
if the staff will even attempt to apply the two-prong test or if it will
just say that the determination is simply too difficult to make.
What follows are some examples of staff reversals of position under
the ordinary business operations exception, all of which, at least in
part, were based on increased legislative interest in the subject matter
of the proposal in question. Even though the SEC staff attempts to
substantiate each reversal of position by stating that there has been
increased legislative interest in the particular area addressed by the
proposal, it does not specify such interest. Further, although legisla-
tive interest may be some evidence of the presence of a substantial
policy issue, legislative interest alone does not suffliciently define the
contours of a substantial policy issue. The problem with equating
"legislative interest" with "substantial policy issue" is that, even if we
accept that legislative interest is evidence of a substantial policy issue,
the question remains: When does it become a substantial policy issue?
When a bill is introduced? When it is passed by the House? By the
Senate? When it is signed into law? Staff reversals of position based
on legislative interest in the subject matter therefore do not eliminate
79. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two-part
test.
80. See infra notes 85-107 and accompanying text.
81. See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in
Merit Regulation, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 879, 908 (1994) (stating that "[e]ven more troubling
than the number of policy shifts has been the agency's terse and desultory explana-
tions for its new positions, often little more than a reference to an extant public de-
bate on the question").
82. See Staff Ordinary Business Stance Leaves Counsel Over a Barrel in Proxy Sea-
son, 26 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 637 (Apr. 29, 1994).
83. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
84. See id at 12-14; infra part HI.
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any of the uncertainty inherent in the ordinary business operations
exception due to the subjective determination of what constitutes a
substantial policy issue.
A. Plant Closing Proposals
On November 15, 1988, a shareholder of Pacific Telesis Group sub-
mitted a resolution for inclusion in Pacific's proxy statement and form
of proxy relating to the upcoming annual shareholders meeting.
8 5
This resolution stated as follows:
Resolved:
That Pacific Telesis in joint discussions with it's [sic] labor part-
ners, study the impact to communities of the closing or consolida-
tion of Pacific Telesis facilities and be it further resolved that
alternatives be developed that help mitigate those corporate deci-
sions such as, but not limited to:
[1] Locating new facilities where feasible within commutable range
of old outdated offices.
[2] Remodeling or rebuilding older offices into new more efficient
work environments.
[3] Reducing contract labor in those communities where office clo-
sures occur and make provisions for Pacific Telesis employees to
perform such work.
[4] Study other alternatives developed by officers of the company,
there [sic] staff's [sic], and other business partners.
Whereas this policy would seek to eliminate the burden of laid-off
workers being placed on the community and encoura ging corporate
responsibility for the future of it's [sic] work force.8p
In a letter dated December 14, 1988 to the SEC, senior counsel of
Pacific Telesis requested a no-action letter from the SEC.87 He
opined that the proposal could be excluded on the basis of Rule 14a-
8(c)(7), the ordinary business operations exception. 88 He pointed out
that "[t]he ... proposal relates to the closing of Corporation facilities,
and the Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission... has consistently allowed for the omission of
share owner proposals dealing with the closing of company facilities
under Rule 14a-8(c)(7)."8 9
On February 2, 1989, however, the SEC staff issued a letter to Pa-
cific Telesis Group rejecting their contention that the proposal could
85. Pacific Telesis Group, SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 104
(Feb. 2, 1989).
86. Id at *9-10.
87. Id. at *3.
88. Id. at *4-5.
89. Id. at *5 (citing General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 129 (Jan. 29, 1988)).
[Vol. 641266
BUSINESS OPERATIONS EXCEPTION
be excluded based on the ordinary business operations exception. 0
The letter stated:
In light of recent developments, including heightened state and fed-
eral interest in the social and economic implications of plant clos-
ings and relocation decisions, the staff has reconsidered its position
with respect to the applicability of Rule 14a-8(c)(7) to proposals
dealing generally with the broad social and economic impact of
plant closings or relocations. It is the Division's view that such pro-
posals... involve substantial corporate policy considerations that
go beyond the conduct of the Company's ordinary business
operations.91
The Pacific Telesis letter thus reversed the position previously held by
the SEC that shareholder proposals involving plant closings relate to
the ordinary business operations of the registrant. 92
This staff reversal with respect to plant closings was claimed to be a
response to increased legislative interest in the area. Although the
letter did not specify, "Linda Quinn, the Division director . . . ex-
plained that the Division's change was in reaction to new federal legis-
lation that required companies to give employees prior notice of plant
closings."93 Unfortunately, as discussed previously, no registrant
could predict that the staff would take such a position. Further, the
change in position seems to be no more than a subjective judgment
that the issue has suddenly become important enough to be included
in a company's proxy statement. The economic ramifications of plant
closings certainly was an issue for some time before Congress became
involved. When Congress did become involved, the issue did not sud-
denly change and become any different than it had been in the past.
Congress simply decided to get involved. Thus, the SEC's reversal
appears to rest on no sound basis.
90. Id. at *1.
91. 1& at *1-2. The Pacific Telesis letter reversed the staff's position with respect
to "proposals dealing generally with the broad social and economic impact of plant
closings or relocations." Id. at *2. "The staff's revised position, however, [did] not
apply to proposals concerning specific decisions regarding the closing or relocation of
particular plant facilities." Id.
92. See e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,353, at 76,477 (Mar. 6, 1980) (holding that a
shareholder proposal requesting the board of directors to take action with respect to
the location of new Company facilities was a matter relating to the conduct of the
ordinary business operations of the Company and was thus excludable under Rule
14a-8(c)(7)).
93. Jonathan E. Gottlieb, Regulation of Sharezolder Proposals-Recent Develop-
ments and Some Suggestions for Reform, 7 Prentice Hall L & Bus. Insights No. 12, at
25 (Dec. 1993).
94. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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B. Tobacco Product Proposals
In February, 1990, the staff reversed, and the Commission upheld
the reversal of, its long-held position that registrants could omit share-
holder proposals dealing with tobacco and tobacco products. 95 In a
number of letters dated February 22, 1990, the SEC staff found that its
"prior letters failed to reflect adequately the growing significance of
the social and public policy issues attendant to operations involving
the manufacture of tobacco related products. '96 As one commentator
put it, "Since when?" 97
Once again, the reversal of position was purportedly based upon
increased legislative interest in the area. Nevertheless, the letters
from the SEC did not mention this.98 Linda Quinn, the SEC Division
Director, explained that the change in position was due to recent fed-
eral legislation on smoking in airplanes.99 Again, the mere existence
of legislation tangentially related to the proposal's subject matter
should not trigger a change in position. Smoking in airplanes on its
face has little to do with the manufacture and distribution of tobacco
related products and the staff failed to articulate any nexus between
the two.
C. Executive Compensation Proposals
Executive compensation proposals have also traditionally been ex-
cludable under the ordinary business operations exception.100 Termi-
95. See, e.g., Philip Morris Cos., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 231 (Feb. 6, 1989) (stating that the proposal may be omitted because "it ap-
pears to deal with a matter relating to the conduct of the Company's ordinary busi-
ness operations (i.e. the decision to cease advertising and abandon a particular line of
business)"); Kimberly-Clark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1710 (Feb. 26, 1987) (allowing omission of a proposal that the company stop making
tobacco industry paper and products).
96. Loews Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 79,600, at 77,592 (Feb. 22, 1990); Philip Morris Cos., Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,473, at 77,413 (Feb. 22,
1990); Kimberly-Clark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 330,
at *2 (Feb. 22, 1990); American Brands, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 332, at *1 (Feb. 22, 1990); Philip Morris Cos., Inc., SEC No-Action Let-
ter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,474, at 77,422 (Feb. 22,
1990).
97. Palmiter, supra note 81, at 908.
98. See Loews Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 79,600, at 77,592 (Feb. 22, 1990); Philip Morris Cos., Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 79,473, at 77,413
(Feb. 22, 1990); Kimberly-Clark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 330 (Feb. 22, 1990); American Brands, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 332 (Feb. 22, 1990); Philip Morris Cos., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) J 79,474, at 77,422 (Feb. 22, 1990).
99. See Gottlieb, supra note 93.
100. See, e.g., The Centennial Group, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 955 (Sept. 7, 1989) (stating that a proposal limiting compensation and
benefits to two company executives could be excluded because it dealt with a matter
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nation contracts (i.e., golden parachutes) were treated the same as
ordinary executive compensation, even during the mergers and acqui-
sitions boom of the 1980's, and were therefore excludable based on
the ordinary business operations exception. 10 1
In 1989, a shareholder of Transamerica Corporation submitted a
shareholder proposal that read as follows:
RESOLVED that the stockholders recommend that the board of
directors adopt the following policy: "No compensation shall be
paid to any director, officer, or employee of this corporation which
is contingent upon the merger or acquisition of this corporation. " lca
Transamerica requested a no-action letter from the SEC based on the
SEC's past no-action letters stating that executive compensation, in-
cluding termination contracts, related to the ordinary business opera-
tions of the registrant.10 3
In a letter issued to Transamerica Corporation on January 10, 1990,
however, the SEC staff stated that golden parachute arrangements
raise substantial policy issues due to anti-takeover, tax, and legal im-
plications, and could not be excluded from a registrant's proxy state-
ment based on the ordinary business operations exception.0'4 The
relating to the conduct of the company's ordinary business operations); Int'l Remote
Imaging Sys., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 684 (May 24,
1989) (stating that a proposal to reduce executive compensation was excludable be-
cause it dealt with a matter relating to the conduct of the company's ordinary business
operations); Exxon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1514
(Jan. 7, 1987) (stating that a proposal relating to the establishment of a formula for
determining increases and decreases in directors and officers compensation was ex-
cludable because it dealt with the ordinary business operations of the company).
101. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 252 (Feb. 22, 1988) (treating golden parachutes the same as executive com-
pensation and stating that such proposals are excludable based on the ordinary busi-
ness operations exception); Crown Zellerbach Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1821 (Feb. 20, 1986) (same); Int'l Business Mach. Corp., SEC
No-Action Letter, 1985 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1842 (Mar. 6, 1985) (same); Phillips Pe-
troleum Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1631 (Jan. 20, 1984)
(same).
102. Transamerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 79,338, at 79,255-56 (Jan. 10, 1990). The shareholder later
amended the proposed resolution to read as follows:
RESOLVED that the stockholders recommend that the board of directors
adopt the following policy: "To the extent possible and allowed by local,
state and federal laws, no compensation shall be paid to any director, officer,
or employee of this corporation which is contingent upon the merger or ac-
quisition of this corporation."
Id. at 79,259.
103. Id. at 79,253-54 (citing Int'l Remote Imaging Sys., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 684 (May 24, 1989); The Centennial Group, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 955 (Sept. 7, 1989); Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 252 (Feb. 22, 1988); Crown
Zellerbach Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1821 (Feb. 20,
1986); and Phillips Petroleum Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
1631 (Jan. 20, 1984)).
104. Id. at 79,260.
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staff limited its ruling to circumstances involving golden parachute
payments. °5 It stated that its "position regarding the applicability of
rule 14a-8(c)(7) to proposals dealing with compensation arrangements
not involving [golden parachute] payments ... , as well as to those
proposals relating to compensation arrangements in general, remains
unchanged.'10 6 Nevertheless, in February of 1992, just two years after
announcing that its policy was unchanged with respect to executive
compensation proposals not involving golden parachutes, the SEC an-
nounced that all executive compensation proposals would no longer
be deemed matters relating to the ordinary business operations of the
registrant.
0 7
III. DEPARTURF FROM Ti 1976 RELEASE Two-PART TEST
The two-part test enunciated in the 1976 Release was applied by the
SEC, albeit inconsistently and perhaps arbitrarily, 0 8 until 1992 when
it stated in a no-action letter to Cracker Barrel Old Country Store,
Inc. that it no longer mattered if substantial policy issues were raised
in a shareholder proposal dealing with a registrant's employment poli-
cies for the general workforce.' 0 9 Such proposals, stated the staff,
were thereafter deemed to be excludable by registrants due to the em-
ployment-related nature of the proposals."' This staff position was
later upheld by the Commission."'
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See Aetna Life and Casualty Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,104, at 79,218 (Feb. 13, 1992) (stating that
"[c]ompensation of directors would appear particularly within the prerogative of
shareholders to oversee"); Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
[1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,101, at 79,213 (Feb. 13,
1992) ("There is now widespread public debate concerning compensation policies and
practices relating to senior executive officers and directors, and an increasing recogni-
tion that these matters raise significant policy issues. Therefore, it is the Division's
view that proposals relating to compensation of senior executives and directors may
not any longer be considered matters relating to the conduct of a registrant's ordinary
business operations."); Battle Mountain Gold Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,107, at 79,226 (Feb. 13, 1992) (employ-
ing same reasoning); Bell Atlantic Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,110, at 79,236 (Feb. 13, 1992) (employing same
reasoning); see also Kevin G. Salwen, The People's Proxy: Shareholder Proposals on
Pay Must be Aired SEC to Tell 10 Firms, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1992, at Al; Breeden
Announces SEC Initiative on Executive Compensation Issues, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 8, at 223 (Feb. 21, 1992) (stating that the SEC position changed because
"the 'level of public and shareholder concern over the issue of senior executive com-
pensation has become intense and widespread' " and because the issue has significant
econonic implications).
108. See discussion supra part II.
109. Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 18, at 77,287; see infra notes 117-
20 and accompanying text.
110. Id.
111. See Gay Rights Proposal May Be Omitted From Proxy Materials, SEC Affirms,
25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 123 (Jan. 29, 1993).
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In June, 1992, New York City Employees' Retirement System
("NYCERS")" 2 submitted a shareholder proposal to Cracker Barrel
Old Country Store, Inc. that read as follows:
Whereas, in February, 1991 the management of Cracker Barrel
Old Country Stores restaurants announced a policy of discrimina-
tion in employment against gay men and lesbians; and,
Whereas, although Cracker Barrel management asserts that this
discrimination policy has been rescinded, the company has refused
to rehire fired workers and media reports have indicated that gay
and lesbian workers continue to be dismissed on the basis of their
sexual orientation; and,
Whereas, employment discrimination on the basis of sexual pref-
erence may deprive corporations of the services of productive em-
ployees, leading to less efficient corporate operations which in turn
can have a negative impact on shareholder value; and,
Whereas, public demonstrations, boycott campaigns and negative
editorial and news coverage concerning discriminatory practices by
the company can undermine consumer confidence and lead to a loss
of business revenue;
RESOLVED, Shareholders request the Board of Directors to im-
plement non-discriminatory policies relating to sexual orientation
and to add explicit prohibitions against such discrimination to their
corporate employment policy statement.1 13
On July 13, 1992, counsel to Cracker Barrel requested a no-action let-
ter from the SEC.114 This request stated that the "proposal is excluda-
ble pursuant to Rule 14a-8(c)(7) because it concerns employment
practices and policies which relate to the ordinary business operations
of the Company."1 5 The request cited previous no-action letters is-
sued by the SEC with respect to similar proposals involving employ-
ment issues that stated that such proposals were excludable based on
the ordinary business operations exception. 1 6
On October 13, 1992, the SEC staff issued a no-action letter to
Cracker Barrel" 7 that gave rise to years of litigation 18 and threw the
112. NYCERS is an institutional investor. Today, institutional investors are playing
an ever larger role in corporate ownership.
113. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 SEC No-
Act. LEXIS 984, at *43-44.
114. See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 18, at 77,284.
115. Id. at 77,285.
116. Id. at 77,285-86 (referring to no-action letter dated April 10, 1992 to Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc.; no-action letter dated April 4,1991 to Capital CitiesIABC, Inc.; no-action
letter dated March 23, 1987 to Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; no-action letter dated Febru-
ary 24, 1989 to Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; no-action letter dated March 23, 1987 to
Angelica Corporation; no-action letter dated February 17, 1989 to Atlantic Energy,
Inc.; no-action letter dated January 24, 1985 to CBS, Inc.; and no-action letter dated
January 23, 1992 to International Business Machines Corporation).
117. Id at 77,287.
118. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
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ordinary business operations exception into more turmoil than ever.
The staff stated in its no-action letter to Cracker Barrel that although,
[a]s a general rule, the staff views proposals directed at a company's
employment policies and practices with respect to its non-executive
workforce to be uniquely matters relating to the conduct of the
company's ordinary business operations .... the line between in-
cludable and excludable employment-related proposals based on so-
cial policy considerations has become increasingly difficult to draw[in recent years]. The distinctions recognized by the staff are char-
acterized by many as tenuous, without substance and effectively nul-
lifying the application of the ordinary business exclusion to
employment related proposals....
[.. T]he Division has [therefore] determined that the fact that a
shareholder proposal concerning a company's employment policies
and practices for the general workforce is tied to a social issue will
no longer be viewed as removing the proposal from the realm of
ordinary business operations of the registrant.119
The staff refused to apply the two-prong test from the 1976 Release
because it was too difficult to make an appropiate determination of
whether a substantial policy issue was raised.'20 The staff thus aban-
doned its prior position that equal employment opportunity and af-
firmative action proposals could not be excluded pursuant to the
ordinary business operations exception because they raised substantial
policy issues.' 21 The justification given by the SEC for this abandon-
ment, however, does not only apply to proposals dealing with equal
employment opportunity and affirmative action. The difficulty in ap-
plying the test certainly applies to proposals in many other areas as
well. The substantial policy prong of the two-prong test enunciated in
the 1976 Release causes the same problems of tenuous distinctions 22
in areas other than employment-related proposals.
Dissatisfied with the Commission's ruling that their proposal could
be excluded by Cracker Barrel, NYCERS sued the SEC for failing to
comply with the notice and comment procedures of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act ("APA") 23 when announcing a new rule. 124
NYCERS also claimed that the position taken by the SEC in the
119. Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 18, at 77,287.
120. See id (stating that "the line between includable and excludable employment-
related proposals based on social policy considerations has become increasingly diffi-
cult to draw").
121. For examples of the SEC's prior position, see Dayton Hudson Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 428 (Mar. 8, 1991); V.F. Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1991 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 238 (Feb. 14, 1991); American Tel. & Tel.
Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1703 (Dec. 21, 1988); Ruddick
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1989 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 1273 (Nov. 20, 1989).
122. See Cracker Barrel No-Action Letter, supra note 18, at 77,287.
123. See New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858, 863(S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995). An analysis of the notice and com-
ment procedures of the APA, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. What is
important for purposes of this Note is simply that the SEC staff refused to apply the
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Cracker Barrel no-action letter was arbitrary, capricious, and unen-
forceable.' 5 The district court agreed with NYCERS' claim "that the
Cracker Barrel position is a legislative rule that can be adopted only in
a rule-making proceeding pursuant to public notice and comment. 12 6
The district court did not reach NYCERS argument that the SEC po-
sition was arbitrary and capricious.127 Therefore, the court enjoined
the SEC from issuing no-action letters pursuant to Rule 14a-8(c)(7) in
which it "takes a position inconsistent with the understanding of the
'ordinary business operations' exception adopted by the SEC [in the
1976 Release], until such time as the SEC adopts a different position
in rule making pursuant to notice and comment."'n a
The SEC appealed this ruling and the Second Circuit recently stated
that the SEC did not violate the APA through its refusal to apply the
two-prong test from the 1976 Release.129 The Second Circuit also
made two very important observations regarding shareholder propos-
als and the ordinary business operations exception. First, the Second
Circuit showed its disdain for the abuse by institutional investors of
the shareholder proposal process. It stated that "[a]fter investing in a
company, [major institutional shareholders] regularly use their share-
holder status as a bully pulpit to promote non-discriminatory policies
in the workplace. [Their] powder and shot are proxy materials and
shareholder proposals."'130 Further, the Second Circuit showed the
confusion abounding as to the proper application of the two-part test
enunciated in the 1976 Release. The Second Circuit stated that
Cracker Barrel was "[b]efuddled by the 1976 [Release]' 3' and there-
fore wrote to the SEC to find out if the company could properly ex-
clude the shareholder proposal from its proxy material. 132
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
As described in the preceding parts of this Note, the ordinary busi-
ness operations exception has undergone substantial changes in inter-
pretation and application throughout its history. Despite these
various changes, however, the exception has not become any easier to
apply, nor has it achieved its stated purpose of "reliev[ing] the man-
agement of the necessity of including in its proxy material security
two-prong test that it had created for application to Rule 14a-8(c)(7) because it found
the test unworkable. l at 862.
124. See id. at 863.
125. Id.
126. 1&
127. Id.
128. Id. at 882.
129. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. SEC, 45 F3d 7, 14 (2d Cir.
1995).
130. Id. at 9.
131. Id. at 10.
132. Id.
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holder proposals which relate to matters falling within the province of
the management."' 33
Due to the limited resources of the Commission, it cannot ade-
quately enforce by itself the rules it promulgated pursuant to section
14(a) of the 1934 Act.134 Therefore, private enforcement is needed. 135
In order for private enforcement to be effective, however, there must
be predictability of outcome. As discussed in the preceding parts of
this Note, a notable lack of predictability has resulted from the opera-
tion of the ordinary business operations exception, especially in recent
years. The determination of what is a substantial public policy issue is
too subjective and makes the no-action process unreliable. For these
reasons, reform is needed.
If the ordinary business operations exception is going to be worka-
ble, it must be rewritten to provide a more objective approach that
will alleviate the problems discussed in this Note. A more objective
approach, however, is not possible within the current framework of
the shareholder proposal rule and an even better solution is simply to
eliminate the ordinary business operations exception. Once it is elimi-
nated, Rule 14a-8(c)(1) can be relied upon by registrants to exclude
from their proxy material proposals that are not proper subjects for
shareholder action. 36
A determination under Rule 14a-8(c)(1) of whether a proposal
must be included by management in its proxy material will in the first
instance turn on whether the proposal is framed in mandatory or prec-
atory language. As one commentator noted:
Under (c)(1),. . . [i]f a resolution is mandatory and addresses a mat-
ter concerning which shareholders do not have authority to bind the
directors or the corporation, it can be omitted as inconsistent with
state law. If the resolution is cast as a recommendation, the Note to
(c)(1)' 37 makes clear that it may be a "proper subject" under state
133. Notice of Proposed Amendments to Proxy Rules, Exchange Act Release No.
4950, 1953 SEC LEXIS 146 (Oct. 9, 1953).
134. See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
135. Id. Private enforcement, for example, would consist of litigation brought by
private parties.
136. Rule 14a-8(c)(1) provides that a shareholder proposal can be omitted by a
registrant "[i]f the proposal is, under the laws of the registrant's domicile, not a
proper subject for action by security holders." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1995).
137. The following Note is part of 14a-8(c)(1):
Note: Whether a proposal is a proper subject for action by security holders
will depend on the applicable state law. Under certain states' laws, a propo-
sal that mandates certain action by the registrant's board of directors may
not be a proper subject matter for shareholder action, while a proposal rec-
onmending or requesting such action of the board may be proper under
such state laws.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1995).
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law. In such a case, the question of excludability will turn on the
subject matter of the proposal. 138
By eliminating the exception, shareholders will get their substantive
voting rights directly from the state law pursuant to which the regis-
trant was incorporated.'39 Because the right of a shareholder to pres-
ent a proposal for action at a meeting of shareholders turns upon state
substantive law,' 4° the right to have a proposal placed in manage-
ment's proxy statement should also turn on state substantive law. The
federal proxy rules should neither expand nor limit that right. Federal
regulations should simply provide a mechanism for a shareholder to
obtain the proxies of other shareholders with respect to any proposal
that he or she would have a right under state law to present at the
meeting itself.
The deletion of the ordinary business operations exception will
eliminate the confusion created by the two-prong test from the 1976
Release. While there may still be some problems in interpreting what
the state law actually is with respect to a particular proposal, 41 the
SEC should be less likely to reverse itself as it has in the past under
the two-prong test from the 1976 Release. The staff will be interpret-
ing state law rather than interpreting (or perhaps even ignoring) a
standard that it promulgated.
This proposal provides more vitality to a shareholder's right to take
part in corporate governance. The elimination of the ordinary busi-
ness operations exception may allow more shareholder proposals to
get into management's proxy material, but it should not be a great
burden on registrants. Many other exceptions remain and as long as
states define proper subject as not including ordinary business opera-
tions, a proposal dealing with ordinary business operations should still
be excludable. All parties will gain due to increased predictability.
Further, states will be able to define proper subjects for shareholder
action if they choose. The SEC would then have to accept this defini-
tion of proper subject. This will further increase predictability. Cor-
porations will then be able to take into account shareholder voting
rights when choosing where to incorporate.
138. Solomon et al., supra note 1, at 615.
139. If a shareholder does not like the voting rights created by state corporation
law, he can simply sell his shares (assuming there is a market for them) and buy shares
of a corporation that is incorporated in a different state that will provide for voting
rights that are more in accord with the desires of the shareholder. Similarly, a corpo-
ration can incorporate in the first instance or re-incorporate in a state that provides it
with what it deems to be the most advantageous set of substantive voting rights.
140. See Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice with
Respect to Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 12,599, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,635 (July 7, 1976); Solomon et al.,
supra note 1, at 612 (stating that "the shareholder proposal rule is a federal mecha-
nism to enhance a state created right of the shareholder").
141. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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Once the ordinary business operations exception is deleted, some
measure of predictability will finally exist. Both shareholders and reg-
istrants will be better able to predict if any given proposal should be
included or excluded. Some problems may arise in determining
whether a subject is a proper subject under state law,142 but those
problems are already present because even under the current regime,
a determination is made as to whether the proposal in question is a
proper subject for shareholder action. By deleting the ordinary busi-
ness operations exception, at least one layer of confusion will be
eliminated.
CONCLUSION
The results obtained by using the two-part test from the 1976 Re-
lease to determine whether a proposal must be included by manage-
ment in its proxy material, or whether a proposal may be excluded
based on the ordinary business operations exception, have been in-
consistent at best. Recently, the SEC staff has determined that it will
not always even attempt to apply the two-part test, and the Second
Circuit has upheld this decision. Too much unpredictability now sur-
rounds the exception for it to be of any value.
The ordinary business operations exception has undergone many
changes throughout its lifetime, both in form and substance. The time
has come to make one final change to the exception: it should be
eliminated. Once eliminated, Rule 14a-8(c)(1) can be relied upon by
a company to exclude from its proxy material a shareholder proposal
that is not a proper subject under state law. While the determination
of what is proper under state law is not without its difficulties, it is
better than the truly ad hoc, arbitrary decisions, and inconsistent re-
sults that have become prevalent under the current regime.
To return to the advice sought by MOW, Mary Miknora's difficul-
ties with application of the ordinary business operations exception are
now clear. She will have to hurdle many obstacles to find an answer,
and even then she will be unsure of her conclusion because she has no
way of knowing if the two-prong test from the 1976 Release will be
applied to her situation. If the ordinary business operations exception
were eliminated she might still face some problems in determining
what is a proper subject under state law, but she would not be subject
to the inherent subjectiveness of the ordinary business operations ex-
ception or the possibility that the SEC will not even apply the two-
part test that it promulgated. She will only have to look to see what
the state law is with respect to shareholder voting rights. Mary
Miknora would be much better off if the exception did not exist.
The deletion of the ordinary business operations exception will
avoid the arbitrariness of the Commission, eliminate at least one layer
142. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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of confusion, and will send the issue back to state law where it right-
fully belongs.

